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Many analysts expect the aging population to lead to a reduction in the growth of living 
standards. Income inequality – a problem that has been accentuated by the payroll tax 
hikes that were necessary to fund the public pension as the population ages – is becoming 
an increasing challenge at the same time. As a result, policy-makers need to pursue 
initiatives that can simultaneously address both our efficiency and our equity objectives. 
With the challenge of the aging population, it is all the more important that we not rely on 
fiscal policies that involve a trade-off between growth and equality. This paper identifies 
a strategy for tax policy that meets these objectives.    
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The aging population has raised at least two challenges for economic policy. First, 
as Denton and Spencer (1998) have shown, the ongoing rate of increase in material living 
standards can be expected to slow if there is not an increase in productivity growth. 
Second, as Souare (2003) has shown, the increase in payroll tax rates that has been the 
Canadian solution to the fact that the aging population would have otherwise left our 
public pension system under funded, can be expected to raise Canada’s natural 
unemployment rate. This development accentuates our unequal income-distribution 
problem. The suggested policy response to the first challenge is usually to argue for tax 
cuts for those individuals who do most of the saving and investing – that is, for high-
income Canadians. The standard suggestion for the income-distribution challenge is to 
argue for tax cuts targeted to low-income Canadians. Since all tax cuts need to be 
financed, these two responses appear to conflict with one another. We seem to face a 
trade-off between our efficiency and our equity objectives; either taxes on the rich need 
to be raised to finance our equity-oriented policies, or taxes on the poor need to be raised 
to finance our growth-oriented initiatives. The purpose of this note is to draw attention to 
a literature that suggests that we may not face such a trade-off after all. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a simple growth 
model containing both rich and poor households is explained. In section 3, this model is 
used as a vehicle for addressing this debate. A revenue-neutral tax substitution is 
considered, and the conditions that must be satisfied for a tax cut for the poor to be both   3
pro-growth and pro-equity are identified. It is argued that these conditions are likely to be 
met in the actual Canadian economy. Concluding remarks, and reference to related 
studies, are offered in section 4.  
 
2. A Simple Growth Model with Both Rich and Poor Households 
We follow a suggestion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 144-146) and 
consider a model with both physical and human capital, and we assume that the same 
production process can be used to produce all items in the economy (both forms of 
capital, private consumption goods, and government services). That production function 
is Cobb-Douglas: 
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where the variables are: Y – output, K – physical capital (owned entirely by the rich), H – 
human capital owned by the rich, J – human capital owned by the poor, and q – the 
quality index that defines the effectiveness of each unit of the poor’s human capital on 
the job. The details concerning this quality index are explained below when the behaviour 
of firms is discussed. 
The economy’s resource constraint is  
  J H K G E C Y & & & + + + + + =  
This equation states that output takes the form of: C – consumption by rich households, 
plus E – expenditures by poor households, plus G – government programs, plus capital 
accumulation (increases in K, H and J (the dots indicate time derivatives)).  
  The government budget constraint is 
  wJ vH rK G λ τ + + = ) (    4
This equation states that there is no government debt, and that the budget is balanced at 
each point in time. Program spending is financed by a proportional tax levied on the 
income of the rich (the first term on the right-hand side) and a proportional tax on the 
income of the poor (the second term on the right-hand side). The new notation is: r – the 
rental rate earned by physical capital, v – the rent earned by human capital owned by the 
rich, w – the rent earned on the human capital owned by the poor, τ – the tax rate levied 
on the rich, and λ – the tax rate levied on the poor.   
  The remaining equations of the model define optimal behaviour for households 
and firms. Rich households operate as ever-lasting dynasties. They enjoy their work, so 
there is no labour-leisure choice and no potential shirking on the job. Their utility (U) 
function is simple and standard:  
  ∫
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t
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where ρ is the rate of time preference. Utility maximization leads to two conditions. The 
first is the Ramsey (1928) condition, which is the solution to the consumption-savings 
choice. Households save if the after-tax return on capital exceeds their rate of impatience, 
and saving makes positive growth in consumption possible. Hence: 
 . ) 1 ( / ρ τ − − = r C C &  
The second optimizing rule is that each household’s portfolio of assets must be in 
equilibrium, and since the rich pay the same tax rate on income from both physical and 
human capital, this requires that  
  . v r =  
There are two differences between rich and poor households. First, the poor do 
not like their jobs, so they are tempted to shirk while renting out their human capital in   5
the workplace. Shirking results in a lower value of the worker’s quality index, q. Second, 
these individuals are impatient. The implication of the shirking is explained when the 
behaviour of profit-maximizing firms is explained in the next paragraph. The implication 
of the impatience is straightforward. For these individuals, since their time-preference 
rate exceeds the after-tax return on saving, it is never rational to save. Thus, these 
households do not acquire the ownership of any physical capital, and they accumulate 
human capital only because they have to. (It is assumed that there is compulsory 
attendance in school, so even poor households must invest in the human capital that is 
required to keep a job on an ongoing basis (in a balanced-growth equilibrium).) The 
consumption function for these households is simply their budget constraint; they 
consume all their current resources at each point in time, and so (in Mankiw’s (2000)  
terminology) they live “hand-to-mouth”. This expenditure function is: 
. ) 1 ( J J w E & − − = λ  
  We complete the specification of the model by describing firms’ behaviour. Profit 
maximization leads to four conditions. The first three are standard optimal hiring rules – 
that each factor be hired up to the point that its marginal product just equal its rental 
price: 
  r K Y = / α  
  v H Y = / β  
  w J Y = − − / ) 1 ( β α  
The final rule firms must follow to maximize profits is that they must pick the wage 
offered to poor workers that delivers the profit-maximizing level of worker effort on the 
job. We assume that Solow’s (1979) simple specification applies; that is, we assume that   6
worker quality is a function of the after-tax wage:  )). 1 ( ( λ − = w q q  This specification 
leads to the proposition that firms keep the after-tax wage constant. Hence, the following 
relationship completes the model: 
  Ω = − ) 1 ( λ w   
where Ω is constant, and this implies that q is unaffected by tax policy.  
  This model can be specified in a more compact form, and the remainder of this 
section is devoted to explaining how. First, the equal-yield condition for the rich and the 
two optimal hiring rules for their factors imply 
 . / / α β = K H  
Second, the constancy of the poor’s after-tax wage and the optimal hiring rule for their 
factor imply 
  ). / )( / ) 1 )( 1 (( / K Y K J Ω − − − = λ β α   
Third, the production function can be divided through by K, and then these last two 
relationships can be substituted in. The result is 
  AK Y =  
where 
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We see that the model has the detailed structure that has been outlined above, while at the 
same time, it can be solved as simply as the traditional “AK” model. Scarth (2007, p. 238-
239) explains a standard property of this class of models – that there is no transitional 
dynamics. The system is always in its balanced-growth equilibrium. Balanced growth   7
means that Y, C, E, K, H and J all grow at the same rate. Several of the model’s equations 
can be re-written so that this balanced-growth condition,  
, / / / / n J J H H K K C C = = = = & & & & can be substituted in. First, divide the poor household’s 
expenditure function through by K, and substitute in the (J/K) expression, (Y/K) = A, and 
the balanced-growth assumption. The result is 
  ) / 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( Ω − − − − = n A e β α λ       ( 1 )  
where  . / K E e =  The economy’s resource constraint can be re-written in a similar 
manner. We divide this relationship through by K, then substitute in the (H/K), (J/K) and 
e expressions (and the balanced-growth condition) to get 
 )) / ( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( α β β α λ + + − − − + = − n A c g A     (2) 
where  Y G g / =  is the ratio of government program spending to GDP.  
The government budget constraint is simplified by dividing through by Y and 
substituting in the optimal hiring rules. The result is 
 . ) 1 ( ) ( λ β α τ β α − − + + = g        ( 3 )  
The consumption function of the rich can be re-written as 
 . ) 1 ( ρ τ − − = r n         ( 4 )  
The model we solve in the next section is a six-equation system: equations (1) through 
(4) along with 
  A r α =            ( 5 )  
and 
 
θ λ φ ) 1 ( − = A          ( 6 )  
 
   8
3. Policy Analysis 
The system that was summarized at the end of the last section determines how six 
endogenous variables (n, c, e, r, A and λ) respond when there is an assumed change in 
any of the exogenous variables or parameters (g, τ, α, β, ρ, φ, θ, and Ω). Since we are 
interested in a revenue-neutral switch in taxes between the rich and the poor, we consider 
a once-for-all increase in the tax rate applied to the rich, τ, that makes possible a cut in 
the tax rate applied to the poor, λ. We examine the effects of this tax substitution on the 
growth rate of living standards that is shared by all individuals in the economy, n. This is 
the slope of the (log of the) per-capita consumption time path. We also check for the 
existence of any one-time adjustment in the level of this per-capita consumption time 
path (its intercept). Since the physical capital stock cannot jump at a point in time, this 
intercept-shift effect can be determined by assessing whether either c or e respond to the 
tax substitution.    
  The reason that a formal model is needed to sort things out can be best 
appreciated by focusing on equation (4), which is repeated here for convenience: 
 . ) 1 ( ρ τ − − = r n         ( 4 )  
The direct effect of raising the tax rate on the rich households is that the economy’s 
growth rate is reduced. Other things equal, the increase in τ lowers the net yield on 
saving, so rich households accumulate less capital. But other things are not equal. The 
government uses the revenue to cut the tax rate that poor workers must pay. Each firm 
responds to the reduction in shirking by cutting the pre-tax level of the wage, and this 
leads firms as a group to rent more human capital (that is owned by the poor) each period. 
Since physical capital then has more of this complementary factor to work with, its pre-  9
tax rate of return, r, is pushed up. If the “good news” development (the higher r) 
dominates the “bad news” development (the lower (1 – τ)), this pro-equity tax 
substitution can be pro-growth (pro-efficiency) as well. 
  To check on this no-trade-off possibility, and on the one-time consumption level 
effects, we derive the appropriate policy multipliers: 
 ) 1 /( ) ( / λ τ λ τ − − = r d dn        ( 7 )  
  0 / = τ d dc          ( 8 )  
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The effects of the tax substitution depend on which tax rate is the bigger one before the 
initiative takes place. If the tax rate applied to the rich is initially greater than the tax rate 
applied to the poor, then raising that tax rate further involves a trade-off. In this case, a 
higher tax rate on the rich hurts the rich; it causes no one-time change in per-capita 
consumption, but it reduces the growth rate of consumption. The poor may be helped, 
since they enjoy a one-time increase in per-capita consumption. However, the poor lose 
in that their consumption grows more slowly. If the poor households’ rate of impatience 
is high enough, the short-term gain dominates the longer-term pain, and they are better 
off. But there is still a trade-off, since the other segment of the population is hurt.  
  The outcomes are quite different if the tax rate on the poor is the bigger levy in 
the first instance. This may seem like an unappealing case to consider. However, it is the 
case that, with the claw-backs involved in welfare programs, most low-income Canadians 
face an effective marginal tax rate of at least 80%. The only parameter (in this model) 
that can be set to reflect this “welfare wall” is λ. To do so, we consider  . τ λ >  With this 
initial condition, an increase in the tax rate applied to the rich helps the rich – since the   10
ongoing growth rate of consumption rises. This result emerges since the higher tax on the 
rich – while a distortion in itself – allows the government to remove an even more 
damaging pre-existing distortion (the higher tax applied to the poor). This is an example 
of the general theorem of the second-best, and of the Bhagwati-Ramaswami (1963) 
proposition – that it is best to remove the biggest pre-existing distortion and to remove it 
as close as possible to its source. (For a fuller discussion, see Scarth (2005).)  
  The preceding discussion provided the intuition behind why it makes sense that a 
tax cut for the poor increases efficiency (the economy's ongoing growth rate). But what 
about equality? It may seem obvious that the poor would benefit from this development. 
But policy result (9) indicates than when the initial λ exceeds the initial τ, it is 
theoretically possible for the poor households to be worse off in a one-time-level sense. 
Why is this? The direct effect of the lower tax rate for these households is favourable (it 
raises disposable income). But there is an indirect effect. The higher growth rate means 
that a higher proportion of that disposable income must be set aside to finance the 
household's investment in human capital. Nevertheless, for plausible parameter values, 
this indirect effect is clearly dominated by the direct effect, so ( τ d de/ ) is negative. To 
appreciate this, it is instructive to focus on the expression for the poor households' 
income – before taxes but after investment expenses – as a proportion of GDP: 
. / ) )( 1 ( / Ω − Ω − − = n Y E β α  Representative parameters values are:  , 3 / 1 = = β α  n = 
0.02, and Ω = 0.10. These parameter values imply that the poor households receive a 
third of GDP before they pay their investment expenses and their taxes, and that those 
investment expenses constitute 20 percent of that pre-tax income. These values make 
expression (9) negative by a wide margin.      11
4. Conclusions 
  Several recent studies have emphasized similar outcomes. Osberg (1995) 
surveyed a number of papers (and he paid particular attention to the endogenous growth 
literature) to stress that there are good theoretical reasons to expect that we may not need 
to trade-off our equity and our efficiency objectives. Scarth (2005) followed up by 
providing a specific straightforward analysis that illustrated the direct applicability of this 
view. Scarth showed that an employment subsidy (as championed by Phelps (1997)) can 
simultaneously lower unemployment and raise the productivity growth rate. He explained 
how it is the reduction in the magnitude of a pre-existing distortion – unemployment 
caused by unions – that makes a Pareto improvement occur (both rich and poor become 
better off). Kappius (2007) has extended Scarth’s analysis to make it more relevant for 
the Canadian economy. In particular, she considered an open (not a closed) economy, and 
she allowed both rich and poor households to be unemployed – via Summers’ (1988) 
efficiency-wage specification. She found that only the employment subsidy granted to 
firms – not a personal income tax cut for the poor (such as the federal government’s new 
Working Income Tax Benefit) – raised the productivity growth rate with this 
specification of efficiency wages. Since Kappius found little difference in results as she 
shifted from the closed, to the open, economy, we have limited our attention here to the 
closed-economy case. Our analysis – which is based on Solow’s specification of 
efficiency wages, not Summers’ – shows that the effects of the tax substitution on the 
growth rate are model-specific. So, comparing the results of these three closely related 
studies – Scarth, Kappius and the present paper – we conclude that more analytical and   12
empirical study is needed before this endogenous growth literature can be said to lead to 
clear policy advice.  
Despite this acknowledgement of limited understanding at this stage, however, 
some optimism and sense of accomplishment is warranted. The paper has used an entirely 
mainstream and simple model to show that – in this setting at least – a conventional tax-
substitution policy is sufficient to generate progress on both efficiency and equity fronts. 
The previous analyses indicated that an employment-subsidy program offered to firms 
must be set up to achieve this joint outcome. It is important that an administratively 
feasible initiative (such as a change within the existing income tax system – not the 
creation of a whole new administrative structure) be identified as sufficient to meet our 
objectives. After all, actual policy arrangements need to be in place before the pressures 
of the aging population make the need for progress on both fronts ever more compelling.      
   13
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